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A Reflection on Section 2(b)’s 
Quixotic Journey, 1982-2012 
Jamie Cameron* 
I. THE JOURNEY 
The Charter’s 30th anniversary has been a muted affair.1 Against 
the outline of its early landmarks, the Charter has settled into the rhythm 
of Canadian life. The power to command, surprise, and shift the land-
scape may not have changed, but today the Charter is workmanlike, 
seeming to busy itself more at the margins than at the core of debate 
about rights. Anniversary years like 2012 pay homage to the erstwhile 
days of blockbuster decisions as reminders of the journey to this point 
and dramatic steps taken along the way. A consensus draws around 
vitalizing decisions that gave life to the rights of the accused, gender 
equality, gay rights and the rights of Aboriginal peoples, among others.2 
It is revealing that when the Charter’s finest moments are on parade, 
freedom of expression and the press are scarcely mentioned, much less 
heralded. Why these entitlements have not fired passions in the same 
way as others is thought-provoking, and forms the backdrop to this 
reflection on section 2(b)’s journey from 1982 to 2012. 
                                                                                                             
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. This paper arises from Ryerson University’s con-
ference, “Press Freedom in Canada: A status report on the 30th anniversary of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms”, and is published in S.C.L.R. with their permission. I owe thanks to Adam Dodek, 
for commenting on a draft of this paper, and Holden Sumner (J.D. 2013), my research assistant, for 
helping with my inventory of s. 2(b) cases. Freedom of the press, the rights of journalists, and open 
justice are key themes in this paper, and I would like to dedicate it to the memory of the late Tracey 
Tyler, justice reporter for The Toronto Star. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 See, e.g., Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) 
v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. 
Southam”] (search and seizure); R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 
(S.C.C.) (Crown disclosure); R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.) (trial 
within a reasonable time); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) 
(abortion rights); Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.) (sexual 
orientation); and R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) (Aboriginal 
rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982). 
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Section 2(b) is a test of courage — the courage of a democracy, its 
communities and individuals.3 It calls for fear and prejudice to be set 
aside in the name of freedom for all ideas, no matter how fiercely or 
strenuously they should be opposed. Tolerance for the intolerable means, 
unalterably, that those who are disgruntled, objectionable and mean-
spirited will offend the vulnerable, the sensitive and the fearful. Yet it is a 
condition of this guarantee that expressive freedom can only thrive when 
judgment of its exercise is suspended. Rather than condemn society to a 
fate of unrequited conflict and darkness, this freedom is a mark of 
progress and a testament to democracy’s essential humility.4 
Though judgment must be suspended, freedom is not absolute, nor is 
judgment absolutely suspended. As a matter of judgment, freedom is 
subject to limits when it causes harm. Finding that point along the 
spectrum where judgment allows limits without compromising the 
principle of freedom is no easy task. 
The Supreme Court of Canada is not comfortable with the Charter’s 
logic of rights and freedoms. Under section 2(b), the logic is that free-
dom must prevail unless the section 1 evidence establishes that expres-
sive activities are harmful and can justifiably be limited.5 The Court is 
uneasy with that equation when there is a causal gap and the evidence of 
harm is inconclusive. Faced with that difficulty, the Court sought relief 
from the uncertainty of harm in an evaluative criterion. Specifically, it 
created a methodology known as the contextual approach, which re-
volves around the proposition that low-value expression is entitled to 
little or no protection under section 1.6 With value as its proxy the Court 
upheld restrictions on expressive activities that were deemed marginal 
because they threaten mainstream sensibilities. In this way it devised a 
methodology of judgment to manage the risks inherent in the Charter’s 
guarantee of expressive freedom. 
                                                                                                             
3 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (per Brandeis J., writing a famous con-
currence which provides an eloquent paean to the First Amendment’s roots in democratic courage). 
4 The hallmark of this humility is the power of self-government, with its expectation and 
aspiration that members of the community will participate, collectively and equally, in social and 
political decision-making, and its faith that democratic society will evolve through an open process 
of engagement and debate. 
5 See J. Cameron, “The Original Conception of Section 1 and its Demise: A Comment on 
Irwin Toy v. Attorney General of Quebec” (1989) 35 McGill L.J. 253 (discussing and defending that 
logic). 
6 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”] (introducing the contextual approach). 
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Meanwhile, section 2(b)’s other guarantee, of freedom of the press 
and media, has too often been overlooked.7 Though the press and media 
are prominent in Charter litigation, their rights under section 2(b) remain 
unclear. To date, the Supreme Court has not decided whether the press 
clause is an independent entitlement, with distinctive content, or is 
subsumed in expressive freedom. While it has confirmed the link 
between democratic governance and a free press, the Court has been 
apprehensive of newsgathering, the core function of the press. Constitu-
tionalizing that function would mean granting privileges to one class of 
claimants, and even before technology complicated the task of defining 
its members, the Court was reluctant to single the press out for special 
consideration under the Charter.8 On issues concerning the press qua 
press the Court has been unwilling even to acknowledge a violation of 
section 2(b).9 
The Court’s reticence to enforce the freedom guarantees has not 
made section 2(b) an unvarnished disappointment. There is a crowning 
achievement in the jurisprudence, and that is the open justice principle.10 
                                                                                                             
7 Section 2(b)’s text provides that “[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms: ... 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other 
media of communication”. Supra, note 1. 
8 See, e.g., Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 
421, at 436 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lessard”] (per L’Heureux-Dubé J., concurring, who stated, in the 
context of a search warrant against the press, that “[i]mportant as the constitutional protection of the 
freedom of the press is, it does not go as far as guaranteeing the press special privileges which 
ordinary citizens ... would not enjoy”). 
9 See Lessard, id., and Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney Gen-
eral), [1991] S.C.J. No. 88, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “New Brunswick – search 
warrant”] (the search warrant cases); R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “National Post”]; and The Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2010] S.C.J. No. 41, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 592 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Globe and Mail”] (the journalist-
source privilege cases). 
10 See Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre, [1982] S.C.J. No. 1, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 
175 (S.C.C.) (pre-Charter, access to search warrants); Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6 (statutory 
publication ban); Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 
835 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”] (judicial publication ban); Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. 
New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“CBC v. New Brunswick”] (closed courtroom); R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 
442 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mentuck”] and R. v. E. (O.N.), [2001] S.C.J. No. 74, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “O.N.E.”] (judicial publication bans); Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 73, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ruby”] (in camera hearing); Re 
Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.) (closed hearing); Toronto Star 
Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Toronto Star”] (access to search warrants); and Globe and Mail, id. (judicial publication ban). 
Decisions in which the claim failed include Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 67, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Newspapers”] 
(statutory publication ban); Vickery v. Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), [1991] S.C.J. No. 
23, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 671 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vickery”] (common law, access to evidence); Sierra 
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On this issue the Court has shown that it can be fearless as well as 
principled in protecting expressive and press freedoms. Despite or 
because of those contributions, which are singular as well as laudatory, 
this jurisprudence confuses. Setting it alongside the Court’s other 
decisions makes a muddle of section 2(b) and poses the question whether 
there is a way to understand the guarantee’s journey that spares it from 
incoherence. Exploring the underlying assumptions of the Court’s 
conception of freedom and asking whether the open justice principle is 
based on core differences might provide answers. 
The 30th anniversary is a checkpoint, a moment for taking stock of 
section 2(b)’s strengths as well as its weaknesses, with a view to building 
through existing strength to the future. On the positive side, the Court’s 
conception of open justice can be described as “thick” because it is 
supported by a methodology of principle that sets evidence-based 
requirements for justifiable limits. By comparison, its lack of resolve on 
matters of principle under the freedom guarantees is dispiriting. There, 
the Court’s conception of entitlement is “thin” because principle is easily 
expended under section 1, or deflected away from section 2(b), as 
happened with press claims. For section 2(b) to meet its destiny as a call 
to courage the roadblocks must be cleared and a pathway for alternative 
solutions opened up. This can be done by building on the foundations 
that are already in place and treating the open justice model as a template 
for section 2(b) decision-making. 
The synergy between section 2(b)’s expression and press entitle-
ments is a key feature of this reflection. The Court’s decisions on 
expressive freedom are foundational, and the discussion begins with a 
brief but pointed analysis of the juxtaposition of principle and judgment 
in the Court’s treatment of content-based restrictions on expressive 
activities. The section that follows isolates section 2(b)’s press and media 
clause by examining its newsgathering decisions. From there the discus-
sion turns to open justice, which is an amalgam of free expression and 
press interests. After explaining what makes that branch of section 2(b) 
                                                                                                             
Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Sierra Club”] (confidentiality order); Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, [2007] S.C.J. 
No. 43, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253 (S.C.C.) (in camera proceedings and informer privilege); Toronto Star 
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] S.C.J. No. 21, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Toronto Star v. Canada”] (statutory publication ban); Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 2, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19 (access to courthouse premises); and 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 3, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 
65 (S.C.C.) (access to evidence). 
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exemplary and why it provides a model for emulation, this reflection 
closes with some thoughts about the journey ahead. 
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: PRINCIPLE, JUDGMENT  
AND A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS 
Freedom of expression claims landmarks of its own in the first 30 
years.11 The Supreme Court invalidated high-stakes policy limits on 
commercial expression in two of its more notable decisions, Ford v. 
Quebec (Attorney General) and RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney 
General), and then followed up each time with careful steps back at the 
next opportunity.12 It held the state to section 1’s requirement that limits 
be demonstrably justified in Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons 
of Ontario and Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (Attorney General), but 
rather than describe a pattern these decisions look more like exceptions.13 
Elsewhere, if few predicted that the Court would invalidate the false 
news provision of the Criminal Code,14 R. v. Zundel15 was still an outlier. 
And when Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General)16 struck down Quebec’s 
scheme for political participation in referendum campaigns it was a 
                                                                                                             
11 This part does not discuss the open justice jurisprudence or the decisions on access to 
public property under s. 2(b). The access cases include Canada v. Committee for the Commonwealth 
(Canada), [1991] S.C.J. No. 3, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.) (invalidating airport prohibitions on 
expressive activity); Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), [1993] S.C.J. No. 87, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 
(S.C.C.) (invalidating a ban on postering); Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. 
No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Montréal (City)”] (upholding a noise by-law); 
and Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students, [2009] S.C.J. 
No. 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Translink”] (invalidating regulations that 
prohibited political advertising on buses). 
12 See Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ford”] (invalidating Bill 101’s outdoor sign provision which prohibited the 
use of other languages and made French mandatory), and Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”] (upholding 
Quebec’s children’s advertising law a few months later under a different s. 1 standard). See also 
RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”] (invalidating Parliament’s tobacco advertising law) and Canada 
(Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] S.C.J. No. 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “JTI-Macdonald”] (upholding the next federal anti-tobacco law). 
13 Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rocket”] (invalidating legislative restrictions on professional 
advertising); Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 
1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) (invalidating a 72-hour opinion poll blackout at the end of federal election 
campaigns). 
14 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
15 [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.). 
16 [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) (invalidating restrictions on third 
party participation under Quebec’s referendum law). 
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section 2(b) victory in name only. Other markers on the rights-protective 
side of the ledger include the Court’s support for the section 2(b) rights 
of labour unions,17 its invalidation of regulatory instruments,18 and its 
recent modifications to the common law of defamation.19 
An inventory would show that decisions upholding reasonable limits 
outstrip those protecting expressive freedom by a margin of about two to 
one.20 Whether that ratio is out of step in comparison to other Charter 
guarantees, what stands out is the Court’s willingness to confer its 
blessing on content-based restrictions. Not only did the criminalization of 
expressive activity survive the Charter in all cases but R. v. Zundel, the 
Court left limits intact under human rights codes, election laws and 
regulatory statutes, anti-tobacco legislation, defamation law and munici-
pal by-laws.21 
                                                                                                             
17 U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] S.C.J. No. 44, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 
(S.C.C.) (protecting secondary leafleting during a labour strike); R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-
Cola Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.) (extending Charter protection to 
secondary picketing). 
18 R. v. Guignard, [2002] S.C.J. No. 16, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Guignard”] 
(invalidating a municipal sign by-law); Translink, supra, note 11. 
19 WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “WIC Radio”] (modifying the fair comment doctrine); Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 
61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.) (creating a new defence of “public interest responsible communica-
tion”); and Crookes v. Newton, [2011] S.C.J. No. 47, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 (S.C.C.) (concluding that 
hyperlinking is not publication); see also Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia CMR Inc., [2011] 
S.C.J. No. 9, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bou Malhab”] (dismissing a claim for group 
defamation under Quebec civil law). 
20 Though the numbers can change, depending on how companion cases and claims which 
were summarily dismissed are counted, my rough inventory shows that the s. 2(b) claim failed in 45 
or more cases and only succeeded about 25 times. 
21 On the criminal law and s. 2(b) of the Charter, see Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of 
the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Solicitation Reference”]; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Keegstra”]; R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (upholding solicitation, hate propaganda, obscenity, defamatory libel and child 
pornography provisions). Under human rights legislation the Court limited expressive freedom in 
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.); 
Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (S.C.C.); and 
Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.). 
The claim failed on election and legislative issues in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova 
Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] S.C.J. No. 2, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319 (S.C.C.); Haig 
v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.); Native Women’s Assn. of Canada v. 
Canada, [1994] S.C.J. No. 93, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper”]; and R. v. Bryan, [2007] 
S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 55 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bryan”]. On customs regulation, see Little 
Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 
1120 (S.C.C.) (finding a violation but not striking the legislation); on tobacco reform see JTI-
Macdonald, supra, note 12; and on municipal by-laws see Montréal (City), supra, note 11. 
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This branch of the section 2(b) jurisprudence is grounded in a con-
tradiction between the scope of the guarantee and section 1’s concept of 
reasonable limits. That dynamic is encouraged and reinforced by the 
text’s formal separation of breach and justification. At least initially, the 
separation of function seemed advantageous to section 2(b) and its 
guarantee of expressive freedom. In answer to those who supported 
definitional limits, Ford relied on the Charter’s text and structure to 
explain why section 2(b) protects commercial expression. The panel 
maintained, as a matter of interpretation, that the scope of entitlement 
should be generously interpreted because the question of limits was 
specifically assigned by the text to section 1.22 
A few months later, Irwin Toy followed Ford’s lead on that point and 
mapped out a framework for expressive freedom.23 There, the Court 
resisted the impulse to exclude offensive and objectionable material from 
the Charter and declared that section 2(b) protects all content of expres-
sion. Much to their credit, Dickson C.J.C., together with Wilson and 
Lamer JJ., saw that assessing the relative value of messages is incom-
patible with a guarantee of expressive freedom.24 They realized that the 
Charter’s protection cannot depend on consensus views about content’s 
value and that it is necessary, instead, to suspend judgment of expres-
sion’s merits under section 2(b).25 In the face of support for a prescriptive 
definition of expressive freedom, Irwin Toy’s unflinching endorsement of 
content neutrality was unexpected, if not radical. 
Though its two-step test is awkward, Irwin Toy’s core principle of 
content neutrality is sound.26 That “freedom principle” rests on an 
                                                                                                             
22 Ford, supra, note 12, at para. 57 (stating that the scope of protection and the permissibili-
ty of limits are “two distinct questions and call for two distinct analytical processes”, and concluding 
that in most instances any weighing of competing values will take place in s. 1, rather than at the 
earlier stage of defining the scope of the right). 
23 Irwin Toy, supra, note 12. 
24 Irwin Toy, id., was decided by a panel of five judges, which is quorum under the Supreme 
Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. Justices LeDain and Estey heard the case but did not participate in 
the decision, and the Court was at risk of losing quorum in these extremely important cases — Irwin 
Toy and Ford, supra, note 12, the Bill 101 case — because Beetz J. also became ill in the interim 
between the hearing and release of the Court’s judgment. For a discussion of the challenges the 
Court faced in deciding these crucial cases, see J. Cameron, “To the Rescue: Antonio Lamer and the 
Section 2(b) Cases from Quebec”, in A. Dodek & D. Jutras, eds., The Sacred Fire: The Legacy of 
Antonio Lamer (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2009) 237. 
25 Irwin Toy, id., at 968 (stating that “[f]reedom of expression was entrenched ... so as to 
ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all expressions of the 
heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream”).  
26 Id., at 969 (stating that “[w]e cannot exclude human activity from the scope of guaranteed 
free expression on the basis of the content or meaning being conveyed”). Irwin Toy proposed a two-
step test under s. 2(b): step one asks whether the activity is expressive, as a matter of definition; and 
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egalitarian conception that extends section 2(b)’s protection to “any 
attempt to convey meaning”.27 Though it required courage for the Court 
to conclude, consistently and in a variety of settings, that the Charter 
protects all content without discrimination, the “any meaning” test has 
been applied virtually without exception over the years.28 By sinking it 
firmly into section 2(b)’s foundation and embedding it in the jurispru-
dence, the Court appeared to make an unconditional commitment to 
Irwin Toy’s freedom principle. 
Under the Charter’s structural plan, the rest of the narrative unfolds 
under section 1. By the time Irwin Toy arrived the Court also realized that 
its framework for Charter analysis was not sustainable, because a 
generous approach to the question of entitlement could not realistically 
be paired with the strict standard of justification prescribed by R. v. 
Oakes.29 Few legislative enactments could survive the combination, and 
that forced the Court to look for ways to relieve against the lopsided 
structure of rights protection it had created. The relationship between 
breach and justification is a constant in Charter interpretation and a 
challenge for other provisions such as sections 7 and 15. In section 2(b)’s 
case the relationship between concepts foundered on the section 1 branch 
of the analysis. There, the text’s logic led to the illogical spectacle of 
unqualified content neutrality under section 2(b) and unguarded content 
discrimination under section 1. 
After opening up the guarantee, Irwin Toy planted the first seeds of 
contradiction by proposing a dichotomized approach to section 1 which 
reserved a strict standard of justification for some Charter violations 
and assigned a more deferential test to others.30 This modification was 
                                                                                                             
step two applies the “purpose-effect” distinction to determine whether there is an infringement 
requiring justification under s. 1. Id., at 978-79 (summarizing that test). 
27 Id. (stating that “if the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expres-
sive content and prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee”). 
28 The purpose-effect test quickly subsided and has rarely been applied to limit the scope of 
s. 2(b). For a recent discussion, see R. Elliot, “Back to Basics: A Critical Look at the Irwin Toy 
Framework for Freedom of Expression” (2011) 15:2 Rev. Const. Stud. 205. 
29 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) (propos-
ing a generous approach to the Charter’s rights), and R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 
S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”] (introducing a strict and structured framework for s. 1 
analysis). 
30 Under this view, stricter scrutiny would apply to claims arising under the Charter’s legal 
rights from ss. 7 to 14, because the state acts as the “singular antagonist” of the individual and the 
Court can assess the justifiability of the violation with some certainty. The Court said the same is not 
true when the government’s infringement protects vulnerable groups or otherwise strikes a balance 
between the claims of competing groups; in such circumstances, s. 1 will be satisfied where the 
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designed to spare statutory provisions on matters of public policy, such 
as Quebec’s prohibition on children’s advertising. Adjusting the section 1 
test downward allowed the Court to uphold legislation that would not 
have been justifiable under the terms of Oakes.31 
It did not take long for Irwin Toy’s section 1 dichotomy to be side-
lined by an alternative approach that placed the focus on “context” as the 
key variable under section 1.32 Once introduced, the concept of a contex-
tual approach quickly took hold and became the basis for a methodology 
of judgment. Under the aegis of context, the Court held, first in Keegstra 
and then in a line of decisions, that the Charter’s protection depends on 
the merits of expressive activity.33 In specific terms this approach 
measured expressive activity against section 2(b)’s abstract “core values” 
to determine whether its content is compatible with the guarantee’s 
aspirational objectives.34 Framing the analysis that way made it a 
foregone conclusion that disagreeable expression would fail the standard 
in every case. Under this approach the Court consistently found that 
content that fell short of section 2(b)’s aspirations had low or lower 
value, and saved limits under a relaxed standard of justification.35 The 
                                                                                                             
legislature made a “reasonable assessment” in deciding how to achieve its policy objectives or had a 
reasonable basis for infringing expressive freedom. Irwin Toy, supra, note 12, at 993-94. 
31 Irwin Toy, id., applied the deferential test to uphold the advertising law, over a dissent by 
McIntyre J., who was joined by Beetz J. 
32 Justice Wilson introduced the concept of a contextual approach in her sole concurring 
opinion in Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6. 
33 Before Keegstra, supra, note 21, the Court adopted and developed the concept of context 
in Rocket, supra, note 13. The Court’s majority opinion in Keegstra was the first to link the 
contextual approach to s. 2(b)’s underlying values and to use those values to attenuate the standard 
of justification under s. 1 and uphold limits on low-value expression. That approach would be 
followed in a number of cases including Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 
64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.), and Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, the 
Solicitation Reference, R. v. Butler, Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15 and R. v. Lucas, 
all supra, note 21. See also R. v. Zundel (dissenting opinion), supra, note 15 and RJR-MacDonald 
(dissenting opinion), supra, note 12. 
34 Chief Justice Dickson’s majority opinion in Keegstra, id., provided the model. First he 
stated that “[o]ne must ask whether the expression [in question] is tenuously connected to the values 
underlying s. 2(b) so as to make the restriction ‘easier to justify’”, and added that the expression 
targeted by the hate propaganda provision “is of limited importance when measured against free 
expression values”. Id., at 761-62. He concluded that the expression “contributes little to the 
aspirations of Canadians or Canada in either the quest for truth, the promotion of individual self-
development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the participation of all 
individuals is accepted and encouraged”. Id., at 766. 
35 As Cory J. put it, “the level of protection to which expression may be entitled will vary 
with the nature of the expression” and “[t]he further that expression is from the core values of this 
right the greater will be the ability to justify the state’s restrictive action”. Lucas, supra, note 21, at 
para. 34. That analysis led him to conclude that the “negligible value of defamatory expression” 
significantly reduces the burden to justify its criminalization. Id., at para. 57. 
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focus on “context” served admirably as a methodology of judgment 
because restrictions were routinely upheld whenever the Court took a 
dim view of the expression’s content. 
Albeit in modified form, the contextual approach even supported 
restrictions on high value, or core, expression.36 Whether the evidence 
could show a link between expressive activity and an identifiable harm 
mattered less because context provided a reliable source of rationales for 
limiting expression. In the process, section 1’s calculus of harm was 
subordinated to the Court’s conception of value. This methodology, with 
its mantra of judgment, cemented the contradiction: while the freedom 
principle proclaimed that section 2(b) is content and value neutral in 
determining the scope of protection, the value of expression’s content 
was determinative under section 1. Under this analytical framework there 
was a shift from a focus on principle under section 2(b) to an exercise in 
judgment — and a distortion of principle — under section 1. 
The contextual approach undermined section 2(b)’s freedom princi-
ple because it transparently and unapologetically invited the Court to 
pass judgment on the content of expression. Of foremost concern with 
this methodology is its misapprehension of the guarantee itself. The 
purpose of section 2(b) is not to protect the content of expression or to 
constitutionalize a process for validating some views and invalidating 
others. The key to section 2(b) is the freedom principle: that what the 
Charter protects is the freedom to express a view — any view — without 
being judged, censored or stopped by the state. That freedom is subject to 
judgment under section 1, but only when expressive activity crosses a 
requisite threshold of harm that is grounded in evidence.37 The contextual 
approach made judgments about value a substitute for the evidence that 
is required to justify limits on principle. It is insidious because it misap-
prehended the freedom principle and re-purposed section 2(b)’s underly-
ing values under section 1. In doing so, it created a section 2(b) ghetto 
and populated it with “low value” expression.38 It is difficult to overstate 
the damage caused by the contextual approach: this methodology failed, 
                                                                                                             
36 See Harper and Bryan, supra, note 21 (upholding limits on third party spending in elec-
tion campaigns and a prohibition on the unauthorized release of election results). 
37 Defining harm for purposes of limits on expressive activity raises fundamental issues at 
the intersection of philosophy, constitutional theory, and s. 2(b) doctrine. That issue is beyond the 
scope of this reflection, which focuses on the flaws of a methodology that conflates value and harm. 
38 Expressive activities that have been assigned to the ghetto include hate propaganda, 
obscenity, discriminatory expression, tobacco advertising and commercial expression more 
generally, defamation, and defamatory libel. For an earlier critique see J. Cameron, “The Past, 
Present and Future of Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 O.H.L.J. 1. 
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colossally, to grasp the essence of expressive freedom and embedded a 
fatal flaw in the jurisprudence. 
The Court has now stepped back from the most objectionable ele-
ment of this approach and no longer asks point blank whether the content 
of expression is valuable enough to be protected by the Charter. Still, it 
has not invalidated a statutory provision under section 2(b) since Thom-
son Newspapers was decided in 1998.39 Nor has it rejected this method-
ology of judgment, admitted that the contextual approach is unsound, or 
indicated a willingness to adopt an evidence-based approach to the 
question of harm. It will be difficult for freedom of expression to flourish 
while these doctrinal missteps remain in place. 
The legacy of this jurisprudence is a quixotic mix of principle and 
judgment. The freedom principle is sound but never counted for much 
because it was simply abandoned under section 1. There, the Court’s 
methodology of judgment rested on a formalistic separation of breach 
and justification which thinned the freedom principle out to the point of 
disappearance. That separation could not disguise the incoherence of a 
framework based on assumptions that are fundamentally at war under 
sections 2(b) and 1. 
Expressive freedom requires a thick conception of principle, under 
section 1 as well as under section 2(b). A principled approach would 
bring an end to judgment-based decisions that uphold limits on the 
pretext that the expressive activity is unworthy. It would permit limits 
that are based on evidence of harm, and disallow unmediated judgments 
of value. And it would clarify that freedom prevails, as a matter of 
principle, when the evidence is not strong enough to permit limits. All 
that said, ameliorating section 2(b) is a relatively simple matter of 
reconfiguring the section 1 analysis. It can be done by drawing the 
principle of content neutrality into section 1 — as the presumption that 
must be rebutted with evidence of justifiable limits — and returning to 
the Oakes test as originally conceived, in the case of content-based 
violations of expressive freedom. 
                                                                                                             
39 But see Guignard, supra, note 18 (invalidating a municipal by-law) and Translink, supra, 
note 11 (invalidating transit authorities’ advertising policies). 
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III. “[I]NCLUDING ... FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND OTHER  
MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION” 
It could be expected, given section 2(b)’s explicit guarantee, that the 
press and media would play a lively role in the evolution of the jurispru-
dence. Here as well the Supreme Court jurisprudence is quixotic. Despite 
leading the way and securing unequalled protection for openness under 
section 2(b), the press has been unable to convince the Court that 
newsgathering per se is protected by the Charter. After 30 years, the 
threshold question of whether freedom of the press and media is sub-
sumed in freedom of expression or protects an independent right has not 
been squarely answered. Partly this is because the Court focuses on 
expressive freedom when section 2(b)’s entitlements overlap, as occurs 
in the law of defamation and on open justice issues.40 On issues exclusive 
to the press and media the Court has insisted that the guarantee can be 
adequately protected without engaging section 2(b). That was its position 
when search warrants were issued against the CBC and again when 
journalists sought help from the Charter to protect confidential news-
gathering sources.41 
The press function is directly linked to democratic governance be-
cause it provides the means for the public to hold government and other 
powerful institutions accountable. The kind of transparency that inspires 
accountability can only be achieved through robust reporting and 
commentary by a press that operates free from government interference 
and functions independently of the state. This checking function or 
watchdog role defines the press and media as an institution and explains 
its constitutional status. To its credit the Court had no difficulty with this 
concept in Edmonton Journal, where a statutory publication ban prohib-
ited the press from reporting on certain legal proceedings.42 It did not 
                                                                                                             
40 Though it is not convincing, an argument could be made that this entitlement is subsidi-
ary in nature because the text states that freedom of expression merely includes freedom of the press 
and other media. Supra, note 7. 
41 The two pairs of cases are Lessard and New Brunswick – search warrant on the search 
warrant issue, and National Post and Globe and Mail on the question of journalist-source privilege. 
Supra, notes 8 and 9. 
42 Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6, at 1339 (stating that it is “essential to a democracy and 
crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly” and adding that “[t]he press 
must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to 
operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny”). Though the ban was invalidated, the 
panel divided by a 4-3 margin on the question whether openness should prevail over the privacy 
interests of litigants in matrimonial proceedings. 
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respond the same way when the authorities initiated a search against the 
CBC to obtain video footage belonging to the broadcaster. 
Companion cases in 1991 tested the relationship between sections 
2(b) and 8 of the Charter.43 By then Cory J. had emerged as a leader on 
press issues and would assume that role again by writing the majority 
opinions in both CBC cases.44 In New Brunswick he confirmed the value 
of a free press in democratic society45 and then cautioned, in Lessard, 
that “particularly careful consideration” is required any time a search 
warrant is issued against the press.46 Having announced these principles, 
Cory J. went on to conclude that section 2(b) does not create additional 
requirements under section 8, but merely serves as the backdrop in 
determining whether a search is reasonable.47 
In his view section 2(b) could be sidestepped by rolling media-
specific factors into section 8’s conception of reasonableness. Justice 
Cory went on to generate a checklist of nine elements to consider, four of 
which are specific to the circumstances of the press and media. First, he 
indicated the need for a balancing that weighs the demands of law 
enforcement against the media’s privacy rights.48 Second, he stated that 
the affidavit in support of a warrant should ordinarily indicate whether 
the information is available from other sources and whether reasonable 
efforts to obtain it have been undertaken and exhausted.49 A third factor, 
which was critical in the CBC cases, proposed that a search warrant will 
normally be issued when any of the information being sought by the 
authorities has been disseminated.50 Finally, Cory J. held that any search 
                                                                                                             
43 Lessard, supra, note 8, and New Brunswick – search warrant, supra, note 9. 
44 In addition to his majority opinion in Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6, he wrote a power-
ful dissent in Vickery, supra, note 10 (supporting press access to a video confession under the 
common law). 
45 New Brunswick – search warrant, supra, note 9, at 475 (stating that the media “have a 
vitally important role to play in a democratic society” and that it is the media which, “by gathering 
and disseminating news, enable members of our society to make an informed assessment of the 
issues which may significantly affect their lives and well-being”). 
46 Lessard, supra, note 8, at 444. 
47 New Brunswick – search warrant, supra, note 9, at 475. 
48 Id., at 481 (stating that “the justice of the peace should ensure that a balance is struck 
between the competing interests of the state in the investigation and prosecution of crimes and the 
right to privacy of the media in the course of their news gathering and dissemination”). The Court 
confirmed and applied the same nine factors in Lessard, supra, note 8, at 445. 
49 New Brunswick – search warrant, id. (stating that “the affidavit material should ordinari-
ly disclose whether there are alternative sources from which the information may reasonably be 
obtained, and if there is an alternative source, that it has been investigated and all reasonable efforts 
to obtain the information have been exhausted”). 
50 Id. 
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of media premises should be subject to conditions that minimize interfer-
ence with press operations.51 
These press-specific factors were recommended, not mandatory, and 
did little to protect the CBC in these cases. Two factors, in Cory J.’s 
view, all but eliminated the threat to newsgathering. First, he found it 
puzzling, if not hypocritical, for the CBC to challenge the warrants after 
broadcasting some of the footage. As far as he was concerned the CBC 
was effectively estopped from asserting an interest in its privacy once 
footage entered the public domain.52 Second, he equated the media and 
public to argue that the CBC has the same responsibility to divulge 
information as any member of the public.53 Though the evidence on 
alternative sources was incomplete in one case and absent in the other, 
the Court upheld the warrants in both cases.54 
The search warrant cases are conceptually and methodologically 
important. At the level of principle the Court provided little discussion of 
newsgathering and its status under section 2(b). The context of a criminal 
investigation seemed to obscure the point that newsgathering is a core 
function of the press and that its integrity depends on a high degree of 
independence from the state. As La Forest J. explained in his concurring 
opinion, “[t]he press should not be turned into an investigative arm of the 
                                                                                                             
51 Id. (stating that where a warrant is issued “consideration should be then given to the 
imposition of some conditions on its implementation, so that the media organization will not be 
unduly impeded in the publishing and dissemination of the news”). 
52 Lessard, supra, note 8, at 446-47 (stating that “the crucial factor is that, prior to the appli-
cation for the warrant, the media had broadcast portions of the videotape ... on two occasions, both in 
French and English” and that “once the news media have published the gathered information, that 
information then passes into the public domain”). Although the CBC did report the labour 
demonstration, the police seized five videotapes, four of which contained raw footage that was not 
broadcast. Id., at 441. 
53 Id., at 446 (stating that “all members of the community have an interest in seeing that 
crimes are investigated and prosecuted” and suggesting that “the media might even consider 
voluntarily delivering their videotapes to the police”). See also New Brunswick – search warrant, 
supra, note 9, at 477 (stating that “[t]he media, like any good citizen, should not be unduly opposed 
to disclosing to the police the evidence they have gathered” (emphasis added)). Compare Lavallee, 
Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 61, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.) 
(invalidating a Criminal Code provision that authorized law office searches, on the ground that it 
violated a sacrosanct solicitor-client privilege). 
54 There was nothing in the information on this question in Lessard, id., at 440-41; in New 
Brunswick – search warrant, id., the information addressed the point but did not disclose the 
presence of police identification experts at the crime scene or explain why alternative sources were 
not available. Id., at 483 (stating that it “must be assumed that the information was drawn and 
presented in good faith” (emphasis added)). 
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state.”55 It seems obvious that a warrant against the press violates section 
2(b), and that nothing in the text negates that violation by asking whether 
the search is reasonable under section 8. Equating the press and the 
public in such circumstances, on the pretext that section 8 posed the 
only issue at stake, belittled section 2(b)’s explicit guarantee. Justice 
McLachlin challenged the analogy by pointing out that “[t]he history of 
freedom of the press in Canada belies the notion that the press can be 
treated like other citizens or legal entities when its activities come into 
conflict with the state.”56 Removing the analysis from section 2(b) 
attenuated the consequences for the press and substituted a malleable 
concept of reasonableness for a structured standard of justification under 
section 1.57 
Only McLachlin J., on her own in dissent, was prepared to find a 
violation of section 2(b), propose a standard that was aimed at protecting 
the newsgathering process, and invalidate the search warrants for failing 
to meet those requirements. Like Cory J., she considered the question of 
alternative sources and the degree of interference with the press function. 
The key variables in her opinion were the section 2(b) frame, the section 
1 criteria, and the rigour she brought to the application of those criteria 
— in short, the methodological rigour of her approach. Justice McLachlin 
began from the proposition that “an effective and free press is dependent 
on its ability to gather, analyze and disseminate information, independent 
from any state imposed restrictions on content, form or perspective 
except those justified under section 1”.58 She placed the CBC’s news-
gathering and reporting activity on a labour demonstration at the core of 
section 2(b)’s values. In contrast to the majority, she also recognized that 
it is the prospect of interference with newsgathering that creates a 
chilling effect on the press function.59 These principles led her to propose 
a section 1 standard that adapted the elements of the Oakes test to the 
circumstances of the violation.60 She invalidated the warrants because the 
                                                                                                             
55 Lessard, id., at 432. Justice La Forest wrote of the need to protect newsgathering but agreed 
to uphold the search warrants both because the media had published some of the materials and 
because the interference with the press function, in the circumstances, was “highly tenuous”. Id., at 433. 
56 Id., at 450. 
57 New Brunswick – search warrant, supra, note 9, at 478 (stating that it is “essential that 
flexibility in the balancing process be preserved so that all factors relevant to the individual case may 
be taken into consideration and properly weighed”). 
58 Id., at 452. 
59 Id., at 453. 
60 Her test for a search warrant against a member of the press has these elements: 
(1) The search/seizure is necessary because there are no alternative sources for the infor-
mation required; (2) The importance of the search/seizure outweighs the damage to be 
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availability of other sources was not adequately addressed, but also 
because the affidavit material failed to indicate why the search was 
necessary and why the investigative imperative should prevail over the 
constitutionally protected newsgathering activities of the press. In 
Lessard she described these defects as fatal.61 Though her approach was 
not adopted by other members of the panel, it presaged the breakthrough 
doctrine soon to be introduced in Dagenais.62 
Years passed before the Court returned to the question of special 
consideration for the press, though issues that joined section 2(b)’s 
entitlements arose in the interim. One example is the law of defamation, 
which has been analyzed from the perspective of expressive freedom but 
has enormous implications for the press. On this issue the Court’s first 
look at defamation under the Charter in Hill v. Church of Scientology of 
Toronto yielded an unenlightened response.63 Justice Cory’s majority 
opinion followed the core values approach that governed limits on the 
content of expression, declared defamatory statements to be of low value 
and unworthy of the Charter’s protection, and refused to modify common 
law doctrine that favoured reputation at the expense of expressive and 
press freedom.64 It is regrettable that the press interest in breathing space 
and relief from tort law’s regime of strict liability was not exigent, for it 
is widely agreed that Church of Scientology prevented the law of defama-
tion from evolving, with negative consequences for press and expressive 
freedom. The Court has since revised the common law of defamation, but 
without admitting that it misfired in Church of Scientology and also 
without engaging section 2(b) or linking its reforms to any theory of the 
press.65 
                                                                                                             
caused by the infringement of freedom of the press; and (3) The warrant ensures that the 
search/seizure interferes with the press’s freedom as little as possible. 
Id., at 455. 
61 Id., at 458. 
62 Supra, note 10. 
63 Supra, note 33. 
64 There, Cory J. not only rejected the Charter’s application but in balancing values to de-
termine whether the common law required modification stated that “defamatory statements are very 
tenuously related to the core values which underlie s. 2(b)”. He continued that they are “inimical to 
the search for truth”, “cannot enhance self-development” and do not lead to “healthy participation in 
the affairs of the community”. To the contrary, he declared, they are “detrimental to the advance-
ment of those values and harmful to the interests of a free and democratic society”. Id., at para. 106. 
65 Grant v. Torstar Corp., supra, note 19 (introducing a new common law defence of re-
sponsible communication). See also WIC Radio (modernizing the fair comment doctrine); Bou 
Malhab (rejecting a group defamation claim under Quebec’s civil law); and Crookes v. Newton 
(concluding that hyperlinks, without more, do not constitute publication for purposes of defamation 
law), all supra, note 19. For a comment that discusses the Court’s defamation reforms and criticizes 
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Meanwhile, the press and media played a leading role in developing 
the open justice principle during this period. The emphasis in this 
jurisprudence is not the press per se but the public interest in the trans-
parency and accountability of the justice system. Still, a theory of the 
press is nascent in decisions that recognized and validated the role of the 
press as a surrogate for, or agent of, the public. It is notable here that the 
open justice principle could not be protected without constitutionalizing 
the newsgathering function, and that is because openness has two arms: 
the right to report proceedings, which is implicated when a publication 
ban is ordered, and the right to attend proceedings, which is compro-
mised when courtrooms or hearings are closed to the public. The right to 
attend proceedings is an entitlement that belongs to the public at large, 
though it also engages the newsgathering function. Far from resisting it, 
the Court embraced the constitutionalization of newsgathering in this 
context. 
One decision stands out for its insight on section 2(b)’s press guaran-
tee, and that is La Forest J.’s majority opinion in CBC v. New Bruns-
wick.66 Not only did he consolidate the doctrinal breakthrough made in 
Dagenais67 and set a demanding evidentiary threshold for limits on 
openness, he developed a theory of the press that was anchored in key 
links between democracy, public engagement and criticism, and a free 
press. Citing Edmonton Journal, La Forest J. emphasized the “democ-
ratic function of public criticism of the courts” and confirmed the Court’s 
view that “it is difficult to think of a guaranteed right more important to a 
democratic society than freedom of expression”.68 That is where the 
newsgathering function tied in to the public interest in access. 
Under La Forest J.’s theory, “[t]he full and fair discussion of public 
institutions, which is vital to any democracy, is the raison d’être of the 
s. 2(b) guarantee,” and “[d]ebate in the public domain is predicated on an 
informed public, which is in turn reliant on a free and vigorous press.”69 
It was obvious to him that the press cannot inform the public and equip it 
to discharge its democratic responsibilities without having access to 
                                                                                                             
its refusal to engage s. 2(b), see J. Cameron, “Does Section 2(b) Really Make a Difference? Part I: 
Freedom of Expression, Defamation Law and the Journalist-Source Privilege”, in J. Cameron & 
B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 133. 
66 Supra, note 10. 
67 Id. 
68 Id., at paras. 17 and 19 (also stating, at para. 18, that “[t]he freedom of individuals to 
discuss information about the institutions of government, their policies and practices, is crucial to 
any notion of democratic rule”). 
69 Id., at para. 23. 
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courts and court proceedings. The synergy between the public and press 
entitlements reached full momentum when La Forest J. stated, this time 
in a majority opinion, that “freedom of the press not only encompasse[s] 
the right to report news and other information, but also the right to gather 
this information”.70 Though he upheld it under section 1, the Criminal 
Code provision that authorized judges to close criminal proceedings, in 
part or in whole, violated section 2(b) of the Charter.71 
Justice La Forest took the opportunity in CBC v. New Brunswick to 
develop the views he had expressed in Lessard and secure majority 
support for the constitutionalization of newsgathering. Still it remained 
unclear whether the Court would recognize other aspects of newsgather-
ing under section 2(b). That question arose twice the same year when 
investigative journalists from The National Post and The Globe and Mail 
newspapers invoked section 2(b) to protect the identity of confidential 
sources.72 These cases gave the Court an unprecedented chance to take 
the next step in developing a Charter theory of the press.73 With New 
Brunswick and the search warrant cases pointing in different directions, 
the Court rejected the analogy to open justice and refused to grant 
confidential newsgathering sources status under section 2(b). It claimed, 
instead, that freedom of the press would be adequately protected by 
common law doctrine. 
At common law a privilege to protect various confidential relation-
ships is available under the Wigmore test.74 It is described as a “privi-
lege” because it allows the party in possession to withhold confidential 
information that would otherwise provide relevant evidence in legal 
proceedings. The question in the National Post and Globe and Mail cases 
was whether the Court would allow an investigative reporter to protect a 
confidential source. In both instances the reporters received damaging 
                                                                                                             
70 Id., at para. 24. In doing so he relied on his concurring opinion in Lessard and its conclu-
sion that “the freedom to disseminate information would be of little value if the freedom under s. 2(b) 
did not also encompass the right to gather news and other information without undue government 
interference” (emphasis in original). 
71 Id., at para. 32. 
72 National Post, supra, note 9; Globe and Mail v. Canada, supra, note 9. 
73 The issue arose once before, but was not directly addressed: Moysa v. Alberta (Labour 
Relations Board), [1989] S.C.J. No. 54, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1572 (S.C.C.). National Post, id., also gave 
the Court an opportunity to re-think the search warrant cases and adopt the view of McLachlin J. (as 
she then was) that such orders violate s. 2(b). Without addressing that point the Court followed the 
s. 8 approach and considered whether the orders were reasonable. 
74 A case-by-case privilege is available to protect confidential communications in doctor-
patient, psychologist, and journalist-source relationships, as well as in certain religious communica-
tions. R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, at para. 29 (S.C.C.). 
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information about explosive political scandals from sources who re-
quested and received a promise of confidentiality. While National Post 
concerned a criminal investigation and orders seeking the production of 
physical evidence which could reveal the identity of the source, Globe 
and Mail raised the issue in civil proceedings where access to the source 
might have brought a defence to light.75 Despite the political drama 
surrounding Shawinigate and the Quebec sponsorship scandal, the key 
structural question was whether the Court would shelter the journalist-
source relationship under the Charter. 
Justice Binnie’s majority opinion in National Post was quick to 
praise the virtues of a free press, the role of confidential sources and the 
democratic importance of investigative reporting.76 Once having done so, 
he rejected a Charter approach to this issue in no uncertain terms77 and 
maintained that a free press is sufficiently protected by infusing the 
common law Wigmore test with Charter values.78 While the Court flatly 
refused to protect the journalist’s source in National Post, LeBel J.’s 
majority opinion in Globe and Mail provided a more source-protective 
interpretation of the Wigmore standard.79 
The common law was attractive to the Court because the Wigmore 
test incorporates a balancing test that weighs the law’s interest in access 
to the evidence against the public interest in protecting confidential 
sources.80 Grant v. Torstar Corp. was still fresh at the time, and there the 
                                                                                                             
75 For extensive analysis see J. Cameron, “Of Scandals, Sources and Secrets: Investigative 
Reporting, National Post and Globe and Mail”, in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 232. 
76 National Post, supra, note 9, at paras. 28-34 (discussing freedom of expression and the 
press, and the importance of confidential sources). 
77 Id., at paras. 37-41 (explaining why the constitutional model should be rejected and em-
phasizing, in particular, that newsgathering could not be constitutionalized on this issue without 
creating expectations for other techniques — such as chequebook journalism — and claiming that to 
protect “a heterogeneous and ill-defined group of writers and speakers” would “blow a giant hole in 
law enforcement and other constitutionally recognized values such as privacy”: id., at para. 40). 
78 Id., at paras. 54 and 64 (stating, at para. 64, that “[t]he public interest in free expression 
will always weigh heavily in the balance” and noting that “[w]hile confidential sources are not 
constitutionally protected, their role is closely aligned with the role of ‘freedom of the press and 
other media of communication’, and will be valued accordingly” (emphasis in original)). 
79 Supra, note 9 (strengthening the common law standard, in the civil setting, by emphasiz-
ing that the party seeking disclosure has the onus, in the first instance, to demonstrate the relevance 
of communications that are protected by confidentiality). 
80 The Wigmore test’s four elements must be met to establish a privilege: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte-
nance of the relationship between the parties; (3) The relation must be one which in the 
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) The injury that would 
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Court placed its confidence in the common law’s capacity to protect 
section 2(b) by adding a new defence to the law of defamation.81 That 
alone made it less likely that the Court would be receptive to a Charter 
approach in National Post and Globe and Mail. Despite endorsing the 
status quo on journalist-source privilege, the Court’s rhetorical embel-
lishments to the Wigmore test will alter the way common law balancing 
is done and may affect the outcome in some instances.82 Even so, and 
whether the issue is defamation or privilege, common law doctrines do 
not protect section 2(b)’s guarantees in the same way a constitutional 
standard would. 
There are important differences between the common law Wigmore 
test and a Charter solution to this issue. Under the common law, the party 
seeking to protect a source has the burden to show that it is justifiable to 
preserve the confidentiality of the relationship. Under the Charter, once 
the journalist establishes a confidential newsgathering relationship under 
section 2(b), the onus shifts and the party seeking disclosure has the 
burden to explain why it is justifiable to violate that relationship.83 
Moreover, in place of a structured test that is designed to protect the 
entitlement, the common law contemplates an open-ended balancing of 
the competing interests in confidentiality and disclosure.84 In the absence 
of criteria that fetter the exercise of discretion, Wigmore balancing 
favours the disclosure of information that is relevant in legal proceed-
ings.85 By leaving it outside the Charter’s framework of protection the 
Court relegated protection for confidential newsgathering sources to the 
good faith application of Charter values under common law doctrine. 
                                                                                                             
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the 
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 
Cited in R. v. McClure, supra, note 74, at para. 30. 
81 Supra, note 19. 
82 See, e.g., Canwest Publishing Inc. v. Wilson, [2012] B.C.J. No. 808, 2012 BCCA 181 
(B.C.C.A.) (applying the Wigmore criteria and finding in favour of a privilege to protect a 
confidential newsgathering source). 
83 National Post, supra, note 9, at para. 37 (describing the constitutional proposal, the way 
it would require the party claiming Charter protection to establish a constitutionally protected 
newsgathering relationship under s. 2(b), and how the burden would then shift to the party seeking 
access to confidential information to justify the violation of that relationship under s. 1). 
84 The difference is between balancing under the fourth step of Wigmore’s test, supra, note 
80, and the requirements of the Dagenais/Mentuck test, infra, note 100. 
85 That is because the information being sought is relevant in a concrete way to proceedings 
that are underway; by contrast, the countervailing interest in protecting a confidential source may 
depend, instead, on a more abstract understanding of the process of newsgathering and the need to 
protect sources in order to safeguard the integrity of that process. 
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The search warrant and journalist-source decisions are of a piece. 
In both instances the Court was invited to recognize and protect news-
gathering activities under section 2(b) of the Charter. Both times the 
Court dodged section 2(b) to avoid granting those activities constitu-
tional status. Both times it maintained that free press interests are 
adequately protected by balancing tests, first under section 8 and then at 
common law. Both times the press interest had little chance against the 
law’s interest in compelling newsgathering material to be disclosed, 
whether for investigative or testimonial purposes. 
The Court is sympathetic to section 2(b)’s press guarantee but un-
comfortable with its implications. It has been reluctant to protect news-
gathering when doing so would entail a constitutional exemption for 
members of the press. Special rules for search warrants against the press 
and an immunity or privilege to keep relevant evidence a secret push 
against the principle that all are equal before the law. In recognition that 
it plays a distinctive role the Court has been willing to treat the press 
somewhat differently, but not to formalize that difference in constitu-
tional doctrine. The collapse of an identifiable class of claimants is a 
complication that adds to the challenge. As Binnie J. made clear in 
National Post, the Court is not inclined to constitutionalize newsgather-
ing now that technology has undermined the status and identifiability of 
the institutional press. A function that was served in the past by a class 
that could be defined has been all but universalized by technological 
change. 
By entrenching a form of constitutional exceptionalism, the press 
guarantee creates distinctive rights and privileges for members of a 
certain class. The Court is wary of this exceptionalism, and the question 
at present is whether that fear can be overcome. As seen, the Court has 
identified and endorsed elements of a press theory but stopped short of 
granting it recognition under section 2(b). A final branch of the jurispru-
dence shows that the Court can be fearless as well as principled in 
protecting freedom of expression and the press. The constitutionalization 
of open justice is section 2(b)’s greatest feat in the first 30 years of the 
Charter and should be heralded, not only because it demonstrates the 
Court’s commitment to openness, but also because it creates a template 
for section 2(b). 
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IV. OPEN JUSTICE: A SECTION 2(b) TEMPLATE 
A third branch of section 2(b) jurisprudence offers a more inspiring 
account — these are the open justice cases, which stand at the crossroad 
of expressive and press freedom.86 In this setting, the Court’s grasp of the 
media’s agency in promoting transparency and accountability values was 
automatic, instinctive, reflexive. The result was a constitutional solution, 
including a customized section 1 standard of justification. The bedrock is 
the doctrine itself, along with the evidentiary threshold it set and then 
followed in invalidating limits on openness. The distinguishing features 
of this jurisprudence — what sets it apart from other branches of section 
2(b) — are the thickness of the open justice principle and the rigour of 
the Dagenais/Mentuck test.87 
Though the rationales for openness were well ingrained in the com-
mon law, that pedigree was not necessarily auspicious for the Charter. In 
other contexts, like defamation and the journalist-source privilege, the 
Court found it easier to incorporate Charter values into the common law 
than to adopt a Charter solution. Though section 2(b)’s entitlements 
gained ground in the process, improving the common law is not the same 
as enforcing constitutional guarantees. As a matter of chronology, open 
justice had already taken a different turn by the time the Court confirmed 
the common law, in default of the Charter, in defamation law. 
Dagenais is section 2(b)’s most important landmark.88 There, a judge 
ordered a nationwide publication ban to prevent the CBC from airing a 
docudrama on the sexual abuse of boys in Catholic training schools when 
a criminal trial on similar issues was underway in Ontario. On appeal the 
Court could have applied the common law doctrine that governed 
contests between openness and a fair trial. Along those lines, the dissent-
ing judges complained that the merits of a constitutional solution were 
far from obvious and maintained that the common law had protected 
openness for centuries. As far as they were concerned existing doctrine 
did not require improvement or modification under the Charter.89 In 
                                                                                                             
86 Supra, note 10 (providing a list of the Supreme Court’s open justice decisions). 
87 Infra, note 100. 
88 Supra, note 10. 
89 Id., at 928-29 (per Gonthier J., declaring that “the Charter does not oblige departing from 
[common law] tradition in any substantive respect” and adding that “[t]he impact of the Charter will 
be minimal in areas where the common law is an expression of, rather than a derogation from, 
fundamental values”). Id., at 916 (per L’Heureux-Dubé J., stating that “[w]hile this common law 
balancing of fundamental rights was developed in the pre-Charter era, the proclamation of the 
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disagreeing, Lamer C.J.C. noted that the text of the Charter is straight-
forward and pointed in particular to the equal status of section 2(b) 
and section 11(d). To him it meant that the common law practice of 
privileging fair trial at the expense of openness violated the Charter.90 
Not only did he constitutionalize the common law, in doing so he 
introduced a doctrine that protects openness by setting structured criteria 
and emphasizing that justifiable limits must be evidence-based. 
Dagenais marks a turning point in section 2(b)’s history which 
brought the common law into the Charter and established a framework to 
protect open justice. In doing so, it offered a near-seamless transition 
from the common law to the Charter. The Court supported openness in 
decisions that began with Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre,91 
predating the Charter, and Edmonton Journal.92 After picking up momen-
tum with Dagenais, the Court consolidated and extended the Dagenais 
test in CBC v. New Brunswick93 and Mentuck/O.N.E.,94 then applied a 
presumption of openness to an investigative hearing in Re Vancouver 
Sun.95 These developments culminated in the Court’s declaration, in 
Toronto Star, that “the Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to all discretionary 
court orders that limit freedom of expression and freedom of the press in 
relation to legal proceedings”.96 
The open justice jurisprudence is based on a methodology of princi-
ple, which forms around three central elements. First is the principle 
itself. Here, as noted elsewhere, it would have been easy for the Court to 
infuse the common law balancing of fair trial and expressive freedom 
with Charter values. The simplicity of Lamer C.J.C.’s reasoning in 
Dagenais disguised the importance of his decision to adopt a Charter 
solution. To him, a non-hierarchical conception of the Charter meant that 
a common law rule that privileged fair trial against open justice violated 
                                                                                                             
Charter does not render it invalid” and commenting, “[a]fter all, the pre-Charter balancing was an 
expression of the very rights protected by the Charter”). 
90 Id., at 877 (stating that “[t]he pre-Charter common law rule governing publication bans 
emphasized the right to a fair trial over the free expression interests” at stake and in doing so struck a 
balance that is “inconsistent with the principles of the Charter, and, in particular, the equal status” of 
ss. 2(b) and 11(d)). 
91 Supra, note 10. 
92 Supra, note 6. 
93 Supra, note 10. 
94 Supra, note 10. 
95 Supra, note 10. Infra, note 102. 
96 Toronto Star, supra, note 10, at para. 7 (emphasis in original). 
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the Charter and required modification.97 To highlight the contrast, 
compare Hill v. Church of Scientology, which was decided the following 
year. There, the Court could only condone defamation law’s preference 
for the protection of reputation by ignoring the textual significance of 
section 2(b) and the explicit concern in Dagenais about doctrinal 
hierarchies that are incompatible with Charter rights. Constitutionalizing 
the common law test in Dagenais was also a critical step because it 
triggered a process of justification. 
The second step in the Dagenais methodology under section 1 is 
even more monumental. Recognizing that the Oakes test could not apply 
in this setting, Lamer C.J.C. introduced a translation of Oakes that 
resulted in a customized standard to test the justifiability of the publica-
tion ban.98 By the time he proposed this standard the Oakes test had been 
diluted by Irwin Toy’s dichotomy and the contextual approach. Limits on 
expressive freedom under the Criminal Code had been upheld and the 
“core values” approach was well established. The Dagenais test was a 
doctrinal oasis alongside other branches of the jurisprudence that allowed 
substantial slippage on the Oakes requirements that limits be demonstra-
bly justified. 
The third feature of this methodology is an evidence-based approach 
to limits. Elsewhere under section 2(b) the Court surrendered on section 1’s 
requirements and upheld limits under an attenuated standard, on the 
pretext that low-value expression should receive little or no Charter 
protection. As a matter of abstract principle the Court expressed its 
support for freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and often 
did so in strong terms. But the jurisprudence revealed how easily 
principle could be expended, and that is exactly what happened to 
expression under section 1 and the press, which was excluded from 
section 2(b). While freedom’s prospects were dimmed by compromise, 
La Forest J.’s decision in CBC v. New Brunswick consolidated the 
Dagenais test and extended its reach from publication bans to closed 
                                                                                                             
97 Dagenais, supra, note 10, at 877 (stating that “[a] hierarchical approach to rights, which 
places some over others, must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing 
the common law”). 
98 He concluded that a publication ban could only be ordered under the Charter when: 
“(a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, 
because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (b) The salutary 
effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected 
by the ban”. Id., at 877 (emphasis in original). 
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proceedings.99 Justice Iacobucci developed it further in Mentuck and 
O.N.E. by adapting it more generally to contests between openness and 
the administration of justice, and giving the doctrine its current form as 
the Dagenais/Mentuck test.100 
In CBC v. New Brunswick La Forest J. repeatedly emphasized that 
limits must be grounded in a sufficient evidentiary basis, and explained 
that absent that evidence the Court would not tolerate derogations from 
open justice.101 The open justice principle reached its pinnacle a few 
years later in Re Vancouver Sun, when the Court refused to allow 
investigative hearings under the anti-terrorism provisions of the Criminal 
Code to be held in secret. Instead of viewing the proceedings as investi-
gatory in nature and outside the purview of openness, the majority 
opinion characterized the hearing as judicial and indicated that it could 
not be closed without satisfying the Dagenais/Mentuck test’s evidence-
based requirements.102 
The open justice principle seemed invincible until the Court upheld 
the Criminal Code’s ban on bail hearings in Toronto Star v. Canada and 
rejected challenges to restrictions on access to evidence and courthouse 
premises in the Quebec cases.103 At the time, the central question was 
whether the Dagenais/Mentuck test was exclusive to open justice or 
would be broadened to set the standard of justification for all judicial 
                                                                                                             
99 Supra, note 10, at para. 69 (adapting the Dagenais test and applying it to the judge’s 
exercise of discretion in deciding to close part of a sentencing hearing). 
100 Supra, note 10, at para. 32 (setting out the elements of the revised Dagenais test and the 
new Dagenais/Mentuck standard). 
101 CBC v. New Brunswick, supra, note 10, at paras. 72, 73, 78, and 85 (stating, at para. 85, 
that “[t]he importance of a sufficient factual foundation upon which the discretion [under the Code] 
is exercised cannot be overstated”). 
102 Re Vancouver Sun, supra, note 10, at para. 39 (stating that the presumption of openness 
should “only be displaced upon proper consideration of the competing interests at every stage of the 
process” and concluding that the existence of the order for an investigative hearing and as much of 
its subject matter as possible should be made public unless secrecy becomes “necessary” under the 
Dagenais/Mentuck test (emphasis in original)). See J. Cameron, “Governance and Anarchy in the s. 
2(b) Jurisprudence: A Comment on Vancouver Sun and Harper v. Canada” (2004) 17 N.J.C.L. 71 
(praising the Court’s decision in Re Vancouver Sun and its open justice methodology). 
103 Supra, note 10 (noting other unsuccessful claims). It should also be noted that deroga-
tions from the open justice principle are discouragingly frequent in the lower courts. See Globe and 
Mail, supra, note 9 (invalidating a motions judge’s publication ban which was ordered, ex proprio 
motu, without an application, notice, a hearing or argument); see also T. Tyler, “The criminal case 
you can’t know about” (November 2, 2011), Inside the Star.com, online: <http://www.thestar.com/
news/gta/article/1080416--the-criminal-case-you-can-t-know-about> (discovering and reporting on 
child pornography proceedings against an Ontario lawyer that were protected by a publication ban, 
again without explanation and without any hearing or notice to the media); C. Guly, “Need for notice 
when seeking a ban”, The Lawyers Weekly (March 30, 2012), at 9. 
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orders that placed restrictions on expressive or press freedom.104 More-
over, though the bail and courthouse case did not engage that test, the 
worry is that the Court will be cautious, if not resistant, to further 
extensions of open justice and the Dagenais/Mentuck standard.105 The 
challenge at present is to discourage the Court from watering down this 
methodology. 
Openness is not per se a press entitlement but has its roots in the 
common law’s recognition that the integrity of justice depends, in large 
part, on the transparency of the system. This principle is deeply embed-
ded in tradition and, despite derogations under statutory provisions and 
common law doctrine, is bedrock in the Anglo-Canadian system of 
justice.106 Tradition and a concept of openness as a public entitlement 
may partly explain why the Court did not treat open justice exclusively 
or even predominantly as a press claim. 
The Court first celebrated the values that attach to openness in Nova 
Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre, where Dickson J.’s majority 
opinion laid the groundwork for the Charter jurisprudence.107 Though 
access to information about a search warrant was sought in MacIntyre by 
a journalist, the Court spoke from a broader and more systemic point of 
view. Justice Dickson saw the administration of justice as a matter of the 
integrity and legitimacy of the system.108 His compromise, which would 
allow access but only after a warrant is executed, was not exclusive to 
the press but available generally to any member of the public. The line of 
jurisprudence that developed under the Charter is consistent with the 
                                                                                                             
104 Litigants in National Post, supra, note 9 and Globe and Mail, id., tried unsuccessfully to 
interest the Court in applying this test to the question of a privilege for journalist-source relation-
ships. The basis of that argument was Fish J.’s statement, in Toronto Star, that “the Dagenais/Mentuck 
test applies to all discretionary court orders that limit freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press in relation to legal proceedings”. Supra, note 10, at para. 7. Though the remark was specific to 
open justice, the Court could have applied it to the journalist-source issue in National Post, but 
declined to do so. 
105 The Court did apply that standard in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney 
General), supra, note 10, and denied access on the basis of a distinction between a video made in the 
course of an investigation and testimony given in a courtroom. 
106 J. Cameron, “Toward a Theory of Responsible Justice”, in Open Justice, Canadian Insti-
tute for the Administration of Justice (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis, 1994) 138. 
107 Supra, note 10. 
108 Id., at 185 (stating, famously, that “covertness is the exception and openness the rule” and 
commenting that “[p]ublic confidence in the integrity of the court system and understanding of the 
administration of justice” are fostered by openness), and at 189 (declaring that “[t]he curtailment of 
the traditionally uninhibited accessibility of the public to the working of the courts should be 
undertaken with the greatest reluctance”). 
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view that open justice is preserved and enforced by the Court in the name 
of, and for the benefit of, the public interest.109 
At the same time, and with few exceptions, the open justice principle 
was developed under the Charter through the leadership of the institu-
tional press.110 The Court recognized that press access to the justice 
system is compelling because the public interest in the transparency and 
accountability of the system is best served — and perhaps only served — 
when newsgathering activities concerning the justice system are pro-
tected. In this way, the public’s section 2(b) entitlement meshed with 
a conception of the press to produce a constitutional solution and a 
methodology of principle that gave open justice strong protection under 
the Charter. 
The dynamics of this jurisprudence bear little resemblance to the 
Court’s response to other section 2(b) issues. The overall record is 
unquestionably mixed: just as open justice failed in some instances, 
freedom of expression and the press prevailed in many others. Even so, 
the openness jurisprudence has a dynamic that sets it apart from other 
branches of section 2(b). As shown above, the Court relaxed the re-
quirements of Oakes and the demand for a sufficient evidentiary basis, 
with the result that content-based limits were upheld without convincing 
evidence of harm. Where the press and media were concerned it found 
ways to avoid section 2(b) altogether and maintain, at the same time, that 
the constitutional entitlement is adequately protected. By contrast, the 
Court created a methodology that protected open justice through an 
evidence-based standard of justification. 
From one point of view, open justice has excelled because the Court 
is comfortable managing its own institutions and found it easy to achieve 
continuity between a model of constitutional governance and long-
                                                                                                             
109 See also Vickery, supra, note 10, at 703 (per Cory J., dissenting, on the question whether 
the media should be granted access to a video confession in circumstances of an acquittal): 
The public has accepted the media as their representatives at the unfolding of the criminal 
process. However, it necessarily follows that the modern community must rely upon the 
media for a fair and accurate depiction of the proceedings in order to facilitate the public 
right to comment on and criticize that process. This simply cannot be done without the 
degree of openness which would provide the media with full access to court documents, 
records and exhibits. The more barriers that are placed in the way of access, the more 
suspect the proceedings become and the greater will be the irrational criticism of the 
process. It is through the press that the vitally important concept of the open court is 
preserved. 
110 The exceptions include Mentuck and O.N.E., Sierra Club and Ruby, though the media 
appeared as third party interveners in Mentuck and O.N.E. Supra, note 10. 
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standing common law tradition.111 While taking care not to exaggerate 
the differences between the branches of section 2(b), the question is 
whether this jurisprudence is singular because open justice is singular, or 
because the Court uncritically assumed that it is, and acted on that 
assumption in granting this principle a different and higher level of 
protection under the Charter. 
V. THE JOURNEY BEHIND, THE JOURNEY AHEAD 
Section 2(b) has had moments of glory though its legacy, to this 
point, is better described as middling. In reflecting back, the assumptions 
that are embedded in section 2(b)’s 30-year jurisprudence are more 
revealing than a tally of wins and losses. To name and assess those 
assumptions is to understand the journey behind, and to set a path for the 
journey ahead. An element that has played an as-yet-unseen role in this 
jurisprudence is the process-substance distinction, which is well known 
and discussed in other areas of Charter discourse. In the context of 
section 2(b), it differentiates open justice, which implicates access, 
transparency and process values, from content limits which, on first 
impression, seem to involve purely substantive questions. 
To explain, open justice looks like a process entitlement because 
it protects access values. Access to information is interrupted when 
courtrooms or hearings are closed, and publication bans that prohibit 
proceedings from being reported can be just as draconian. Secret pro-
ceedings put the integrity and legitimacy of the justice system at risk, and 
offend democratic sensibilities. In addressing departures from openness 
under section 2(b), the Court was well aware that transparency and 
accountability were key values in the justice system long before the 
Charter. Constitutionalizing those values and developing a doctrine to 
protect them was a progressive step for the Court but not an abrupt 
departure from tradition. 
How different it looks when freedom of expression is at stake. The 
focus in that branch of the jurisprudence is on the content or substance of 
the section 2(b) activity, and not on process concerns. The text of the 
Charter empowers — indeed obligates — the judiciary to invalidate 
                                                                                                             
111 The relationship between statutory and judicial restrictions on openness cannot be over-
looked. The Court has given open justice stronger protection under the Dagenais/Mentuck test, 
which applies to discretionary judicial orders, than under the Oakes test, which governs statutory 
provisions. See Canadian Newspapers, CBC v. New Brunswick, and Toronto Star v. Canada, supra, 
note 10 (upholding statutory restrictions on access to proceedings and publication bans). 
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unreasonable limits on expressive freedom. In doing so, it places the 
Court in the unwelcome position of second-guessing the legislature’s 
perception that certain expressive activities harm democratic values. 
Rather than enforce the freedom to express objectionable views, the 
Court seconded section 2(b)’s principle of content neutrality to a merit-
based test of values under section 1. That approach tested particular 
content, which was invariably controversial, against a standard of abstract 
and ideal value. In developing a methodology to address content limits, 
the Court’s focus has been on a substantive conception of entitlement 
and a substantive assessment of expressive activity. That focus placed 
expression of perceived low value at an impossible disadvantage. 
Assigning process and substance those roles breaks down on closer 
examination: just as open justice is subject to substantive limits, the 
jurisprudence on content limits engages process values. In the case of 
openness, the Court’s section 2(b) solution protects access to the process 
but is subject to exceptions — either statutory or judicial in origin — 
which rest on substantive grounds. These limits protect a range of 
interests, including the rights of the accused, especially in pre-trial 
proceedings, the privacy and equality rights of certain complainants and 
witnesses in the criminal and civil process, security interests, confiden-
tiality, and other interests related to the administration of justice.112 
Derogations from the process values that protect access to proceedings 
and information about proceedings are permitted when it is justifiable to 
prefer particular substantive values. Importantly, those values do not 
defeat the right without meeting a section 1 standard which has been 
relaxed of late but which, in genesis and development, was strict and 
protective of open justice. 
Meanwhile, by focusing on substantive concerns the jurisprudence 
on expressive freedom obscures the role of process values. Unfortu-
nately, that focus rests on a mistaken conception of section 2(b)’s 
purpose. As suggested earlier, the purpose of this guarantee is not to 
protect the content of expression but to guarantee a process of freedom. 
That process rests on the principle of content neutrality, which protects 
access values by setting judgment aside in favour of an inclusive and 
egalitarian concept of freedom. Under Irwin Toy’s section 2(b) standard, 
speakers in principle are free to convey any meaning — no matter what it 
                                                                                                             
112 See, e.g., ss. 517 and 539 of the Criminal Code (publication bans relating to bail hearings 
and preliminary inquiries); s. 486.4 (protecting the identity of witnesses and complainants in sexual 
assault proceedings); Sierra Club (confidentiality), supra, note 10; and Mentuck/O.N.E. (the 
administration of justice), supra, note 10. 
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is — and listeners in principle are equally free to hear and receive that 
meaning, and then engage or disengage with the speaker as they choose. 
It is a view of freedom that is democratic and participatory, and one that 
accepts it both as inevitable and right in principle that undesirable points 
of view also have a voice, a place in the public domain, and a stake in the 
process.113 Elevating process values in this way tests a democracy’s 
courage and humility, in the greater interest of capitalizing on the 
immense transformative energy of participatory self-government. 
Like open justice, content neutrality and its process values are sub-
ject to limits that are substantive. Yet that is where the pattern diverges, 
because content neutrality’s process objectives are not reflected in the 
Court’s approach to justification on these issues. Rather than protect 
those values, the jurisprudence softened section 1’s requirements and 
relaxed its evidentiary conception of what is “demonstrably justified”. 
The result is a double standard and a contrast in approach to section 
2(b)’s primordial value of open access — to proceedings as well as to 
ideas. From that perspective it is difficult to see how this asymmetry can 
be defended under any theory of section 2(b) that is based on democratic 
values of access, participation, transparency and accountability. Equally 
unpersuasive is any suggestion that access to information about the 
justice system is vitally linked to democratic values but access to all 
points of view on matters of public interest is not. 
This brief discussion of process and substance values shows that 
both play a role in the section 2(b) jurisprudence, but also that the gap 
between them is smaller than initially appears. Drawing the analogy 
between open justice and the expressive freedom jurisprudence demon-
strates that the Court’s approach to these issues — conceptually and 
methodologically — is incoherent. The jurisprudence rests on mistaken 
assumptions about the relationship between process and substance under 
section 2(b). While outcomes will vary from issue to issue under an 
evidence-based standard of justification, the Court’s analytical frame-
work must be based on sound principle. 
Similar reasoning demonstrates how much freedom of the press and 
media also depend on process values. Newsgathering is a core function 
that directly involves access to process in the interest of transparency and 
accountability. As La Forest J. observed, news cannot be reported unless 
                                                                                                             
113 But see Keegstra, supra, note 21, at 766 (upholding hate propaganda provisions in order 
to foster “a vibrant democracy where the participation of all individuals” — except those who are 
offensive — “is accepted and encouraged” (emphasis added). 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) SECTION 2(b)’S QUIXOTIC JOURNEY 193 
it can freely be gathered in the first instance.114 Despite readily agreeing 
in the context of open justice, the Court rejected that logic in other 
settings. In failing to grasp the connection between newsgathering in 
different settings, the Court also missed the link to the process values that 
are section 2(b)’s essence. As with openness and content limits on 
expression’s content, this core function of the press can be limited where 
substantive interests are strong enough to compel state access to news-
gathering product, whether in the form of a video, a confidential source 
or a reporter’s files. The key point is that outside the example of open 
justice the Court has yet to acknowledge the constitutional status of this 
activity, much less forge a connection to process values or provide a 
methodology to protect it from interference from the state in all but the 
most compelling circumstances. 
It is not enough for the Court to endorse freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press in the abstract. Though doing so has meant that 
claims succeed from time to time, section 2(b) is at constant risk under 
unsound methodologies. Freedom does not matter much when the section 
1 test foreordains that limits will be upheld, when the Charter’s re-
quirements are satisfied by infusing the common law, informally, with 
constitutional values, or when freedom of the press is lifted from the text 
and subordinated to a standard of reasonableness under section 8. These 
are the legacies of the first 30 years and the point of departure for the 
future. 
The journey behind presents obstacles which hold freedom back, but 
also shows what steps can be taken in plotting the path ahead. It is 
positive that the Court has endorsed freedom of expression and freedom 
of the press in strong, albeit abstract, terms. That endorsement can be 
deployed to thicken the Court’s commitment to principle at both stages 
of the analysis. First, under section 2(b) the Court should recognize that 
the guarantee is predominantly concerned with process values, and with 
preserving access and openness, broadly speaking, on all matters of 
public interest. Re-conceptualizing freedom in that way would link 
section 2(b)’s expression and press entitlements to the underlying 
assumptions of the open justice jurisprudence and provide the rationale 
— through the principle of content neutrality — for a fresh start under 
section 1. This step must be paired with a willingness to support news-
gathering under section 2(b) and develop a theory of the press that 
defines its content as an independent entitlement. Second, the Court must 
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adopt methodologies to ensure that limits are only permitted under a 
section 1 standard that sets and enforces evidentiary requirements. In the 
case of content limits on expressive freedom, the section 1 analysis 
should be conditioned by a presumption of content neutrality, and limits 
should only be permitted when that presumption is rebutted under 
section 1 through the terms of a revitalized Oakes test.115 Otherwise, the 
common law should yield to a Charter methodology on issues like 
defamation and the journalist-source privilege, and interference with 
newsgathering should be treated as a violation of section 2(b) that 
requires justification under section 1. In rough outline, these are the next 
steps in the journey ahead. The starting point for that journey, necessar-
ily, is a theory of section 2(b) that explains why freedom matters and 
why it should be protected, whenever it is threatened.116 Without that 
theoretical foundation, section 2(b) may well be left on the sidelines once 
again at the Charter’s next anniversary celebration. 
                                                                                                             
115 For an illustration of what strict scrutiny of content limits looks like, both on proportion-
ality and evidentiary requirements, see these first amendment decisions of the Roberts Court: United 
States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010) (invalidating a law which prohibited the sale and 
distribution of video and other depictions of cruelty to animals); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207 
(2011) (protecting the First Amendment rights of those who conducted a highly offensive 
demonstration at the funeral of an American serviceman); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants, 131 
S.Ct. 2729 (2011) (invalidating a law that restricted access by minors to violent videos); and United 
States v. Alvarez (June 28, 2012) (invalidating the Stolen Valor Act, which made it an offence to 
falsely claim military decorations and awards). 
116 See, e.g., Irwin Toy, supra, note 12, at 1008 (per McIntyre J., dissenting, stating that 
“freedom of expression is too important to be lightly cast aside or limited”, that the advertising 
restrictions “represent a small abandonment of a principle of vital importance”, that “we have seen 
whole societies utterly corrupted by the suppression of free expression” and concluding that “[w]e 
should not lightly take a step in that direction, even a small one” (emphasis added)). 
